D iscussions of medical malpractice seem to end up at either of two extremes: the trial lawyer's view that injured patients deserve compensation, with the treating physician the best source; and the doctor's view that such suits unfairly penalize judgmental errors while raising the costs of practicing medicine. The were "those of unnecessary, contraindicated, or technically defective surgical activity.'I6 Other sources of the medical "errors" were identified by the authors, admittedly in an impressionistic fashion, as misplaced o p timism, a sense of unwarranted urgency, the urge for perfection, and the use of vogue therapies: all errors of commission. From a legal standpoint, according to the authors, "none a p pears to have involved negligence."' The authors were concerned about their findings, and proposed that a legal safeguard was needed against malpractice suits for errors in judgment, i.e., "error simply related to flawed reasoning" as opposed to negligence.s Malpractice suits only succeed, according to the authors, in driving into concealment the "forces that could help to reveal and control epidemiologic sources of error."9
The culprit of the study is made out to be the tort system, with fear of litigation blocking broader disclosure of within them, even when the physicians were independent contra~tors.~' An alternative theory of "corporate negligence" has been based on the premise that a hospital owes its patients a duty to exercise ordinary care in supervising its staff.** A movement toward strict liability for hospital services, analogous to that which exists for some products, may also be developing. Some hospitals have been held liable for harm caused by medical instruments used in treating ~a t i e n t s . 2~ Courts have usually distinguished the rendition of professional services from the sale of goods.30 In recent cases, however, courts have begun to examine the basis for strict liability in the medical context. In Hoven u. Kelble, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, while rejecting strict liability for medical services, noted the similarity between consumers purchasing products and consumers seeking medical care:
The typical purchaser of medical services cannot evaluate the quality of care offered because There is a trend toward linking tort liability with the predictabdity of harmful results and the ability to discover and prevent them. Expanded liability provides a substantial incentive to providers to improve risk management programs or to face the bad publicity and increased insurance premiums which litigas tion brings. not apply to "those services which hospitals perform for both doctors and patients," because of the "public interest" in having these services "performed pr~perly."~'
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a hospital may be found strictly liable for the quality of blood which it provides for transfusion.36 Similarly, a Florida appellate court held that a supplier of blood for transfusion could be held liable for resulting harm unless it could be factually determined that impurities in the blood could not be detected or pre~ented.~' These cases represent a trend toward linking tort liability with the 6 Law, Medicine 61 Henlth Care predictability of harmful results and the ability to discover and prevent them. Courts are coming to recognize that hospitals are in the best position to monitor iatrogenic effects traceable to their own services, and that expanded liability provides a substantial incentive to providers to improve risk management programs or to face the bad publicity and increased insurance premiums which litigation brings. Expanded liability may therefore create a generalized pressure to alter the work setting in favor of better recordkeeping, more frequent conferences on adverse outcomes, more consultations, and evaluation of procedures not only for cost, but also for iatrogenic impact. 
Medical Errors and Predictability
The tort law concept of foreseeability of harm provides the core justification for a concept of medical culpability which can encompass all four categories of medical errors discussed above. Foreseeability involves a prediction, at a time prior to the occurrence of an injury, of the type of injury that might result from a treatment error, of its severity, and of the probability that such an injury will occur.4o
The use of "foreseeability of harm" as the dominant test of a duty to prevent injury requires the actor either to take precautions or to face liability, where harm is likely to occur and the victim has neither consented to nor can avoid the harm.
The focus of predictability of risk moves us from the individual within a professional group to the capabilities of the group itself, or to the institurional setting, the hospital. Culpability is linked to predictability and to the ability of the profession to alter the level of risk, which it is able to predict .4 I ity will be derived from the increased predictive powers of modern medicine, through its new technologies and the use of statistics. As institutions come to know more precisely the extent of the risks associated with their activities, the ascription of responsibility and culpability becomes possible and fair.'* Even if a medical provider cannot predict the whole range of risks associated with his services, he is in a better position, compared to the patient, to detect and correct as many as The recent studies of iatrogenesis suggest that the problem is real and In each case, the test for foreseeabilsubstantial, but that the medical profession still seeks to avoid linking culpability with medical error. Nor is it uncommon to blame the legal system for medicine's own tardiness in implementing effective monitoring of iatrogenic harms. Malpractice suits may be the best source of regulation currently available for iatrogenic outcomes in the health care system. Proposals to reform the medical malpractice system will be inadequate if they ignore this primary need to deter bad medical practices. 44 The medical establishment needs to be made more aware of the risks it creates. Accordingly, future reforms must note the real problems of medical error and the incentives for correction provided by malpractice litigation.
Any "no fault" system or national health insurance plan, if it seeks to reduce medical malpractice and ensuing litigation, must also provide an alternative means of detering iatrogenic outcomes.
